

Yugoslavia as State of Exception: Đilas and Đinđić

i. The following exposition is a part of our more comprehensive research on "Yugoslavia as a biopolitical experiment". To be more precise, it is its second part, where we will discuss two texts that, we think, explicate in a very special way the socio-philosophical questions associated with the destiny of the formation formerly called "Yugoslavia". Those are "New Class" by Milovan Đilas - indisputably former Yugoslavia's most prominent dissident text, written half way through the 50-ties, and a collection of essays by Zoran Đinđić "Yugoslavia as an Unfinished State", published end of 80-ties, not long before the disintegration of Yugoslav state formation started.

As much as these texts may mark the crucial breaks in particular personal destinies of the authors (Đilas, who from the position of the third man in the ranks of state power turns into the main, at least ideologically, opponent of the regime, and Đinđić, who is soon to become one of the leaders of the Democratic Party in Serbia, leaving de facto the scientific work behind), they don't interest us as testimonies to what Yugoslavia "was" or "might have become". This time they will rather serve us in our effort to answer some of the philosophical questions posed by the new global order.

Hence, what in fact is "Yugoslavia" as a (socio-) philosophical question from a globalized perspective, and not as a subject to research by cultural studies, sociology, economy, ethnology, etc? As much as the latter types of research are necessary, valuable and needed, we cannot rid ourselves of the impression that they are not getting at what is at stake in "Yugoslavia" as a social experiment, one that maybe (and this "maybe"

we take here in all its fragility and possibility that may no longer be possible), maybe has left us as its legacy a distinct emancipatory potential.

In this essay we strictly confine ourselves to the texts by Đilas and Đinđić, while for now we leave aside the reflection on self-understanding and praxis of Yugoslav political elites (meaning, primarily the question of "self-management" in Edvard Kardelj's writing) as well as the interpretation of "Yugoslavia" in the work of the most prominent Yugoslav philosophers (Gajo Petrović and Vanja Sutlić), as those are topics that will constitute future segments of our research..

However, the Yugoslav self-management from a globalized perspective will be of subject of our interest insofar as it a point where domains of a different legality and a different social epistemology crystallize (accordingly, we plan to read the self-management in the light of Jewgenyi Pashukanis's theory of law and Alfred Sohn-Rethel's epistemological sketches). On the other hand, but with the same intent, Gajo Petrović and Vanja Sutlić's reflection will be subject of our debate, insofar as we maintain that their thinking - despite the clearly evident amalgamation of Marx and Heidegger that most of the interpreters take as a starting point, but unfortunately also as an end point of their analysis -, that their thinking, in the very possibility of re-philosophizing the issue of "social revolution", unfolds the emancipatory potential of "Yugoslavian" project that we spoke a while ago.

Here, on the contrary, Đilas and Đinđić serve us as an index of two types of question, both extremely relevant, that the authors detected with an incredible intuition.

But before we state which exact question do we mean, we should posit the horizon of our enquiry in the context of the subject we've been dealing with in this place last couple of years, namely the subject of "biopolitics and normativity".

While in our first presentation we tried to disclose a deep structure of the messianic character of biopolitical theory and the relating fragile normativity of that theory, in the second we used the dichotomy of "political state of exception" and "social revolution" to try to articulate more clearly the normative potential of that kind of theoretization.

This time around, we will base the methodological premise, following Negri and Hardt, on the dichotomy of "war" and "(absolute) democracy". In this context and with the subject of normativity posed in those terms, Đilas's "New Class" puts on the agenda the question of perversion of the political being unfolded in the name of social revolution that wishes to overcome the realm of the political in its entirety. On the other hand, Đinđić reflects on a situation where the state form and the sovereignty are divorced, a situation where the state form and the sovereignty are continuously seeking, missing and putting each other into question.

But, before we pass on to Đilas and Đinđić, we will try to describe the territory of normativity that is opening up if we take as a methodological premise the dichotomy of "war" and "democracy", leading us directly to the subject of "state of exception".

ii. The state of exception *is not*, the state of exception *is valid*. It is in this distinction that can be found no less than the entire enigma of

contemporary politics or at least what we in the 20th century used to call politics. However, the problem is more complex, insofar as the enigma of politics consists in that very unquestioned, enigmatic character of the state of exception, or to quote Agamben: "even nowadays, after all, the public law has no knowledge of the theory of state of exception, and jurists see this problem more as a *question facti*, rather than a true juridical problem."

Es gibt den Ausnahmezustand nicht, der Ausnahmezustand gilt, could be a paraphrase of an order where something has validity, without having a meaning or signification.

Facticity of a state that doesn't exist, yet is valid is - as the biopolitical theory thinks - a facticity on the scale beyond every possible or actualized phenomenology of the political. Hence, the phenomenologies of a Hegelian, Husserlian, Heideggerian or, for that matter, Derridian kind become inadequate to analyze the politics of state of exception.

The state of exception is not subject to either knowledge or consciousness (and thus the science of experience of consciousness of the state of exception) is not possible). The state of exception is also not subsumable under the Heideggerian meta-economics of Being, of an event of giving and receiving. And as much as the paradoxical, genuine constitutive logics of the state of exception might be similar to the logics of event, the state of exception is not an event. In the state of exception there is no appropriation of the political (*ereignen* in the Ereignis), nor does the state of exception exist in the domain of perception (*eräugen* in Ereignis).

Trans-phenomenological distinction between being and validity is the essence of the politics of the state of exception and the state of exception of the politics. And this is then the place where, in their mutual implication, politics and exception, politics and exceptionality meet. And that place is - the place of sovereignty.

So sovereignty is not, it is valid. It is valid, without meaning or signifying anything.

For Schmitt, as is well known, the sovereign is one who decides on the state of exception.

The sovereign decision is, thus, a decision that decides on that exception from the rule, which declares the state of exception, and is consequently, in its facticity, outside of the law.

The state of exception as a temporary suspension of the legal domain is the state where facticity and normativity, life and law overlap. Overlapping of life and law from the standpoint of the ordered domain of law is an illegal exception, indeed a true, i.e. sovereign state of exception of the law. However, although the exceptionality of the state of exception proves everything, and an ordered normative system nothing, the sovereign decision as a supreme act of the political cannot be a lasting one, because the permanency of decision, declaration and validity of the state of exception would, by the same token, entail a complete doing away with the political sphere - and this is in this case paradoxical - in the very act of total delimitation of the political.

The sovereign decision in its own singularity as an exceptional act and a supreme exception from the juridically ordered domain of politics brings about the apocalypse of the political.

Schmitt, in order to avoid such a doing away with the political, has built into the logics of sovereignty and sovereign decision a dialectics of constitutive and constituted power. This dialectics should make the act of sovereign political decision temporally limited and - and if it is possible - foreseeable and accountable for the juridico-political system itself. The *pouvoir constituant* is with Schmitt another name for the politics on the border: i.e. for the political action that - aware of its sovereignty - realizes all the potentials of the political, yet at the same time stops at a border, limit of the political and doesn't pursue the apocalypse of the political in the total overlapping of factitious and normative, life and legality.

But, what if the state of exception is a rule, and not any longer an exception? What if the apocalypse of the political, in the total identification of life and law, has already taken place?

It is to Walter Benjamin and his theses on the concept of history that we owe first indications and directions for answering the posed questions. But it was not before the seventies that the Foucault provided a minute description of what it means to live in a - now already permanent - state of exception.

Life that has become its own law, its own measure and purpose is the subject of politics of the state of exception. However, and this is here crucial, the "law" of life in an existing and permanent state of exception is no longer a law in the sense of juridico-political system, it is rather an act that has the power of law. Thus, in the state of exception a political act par excellence of regulating life becomes a decree, act that has the power of law, yet itself is not a law.

The logics of sovereignty, which in its radicalization has led to the overlapping of factitious and normative and to the concomitant doing away with the political in a condition of the state of exception becomes, according to Foucault, a logics of governmentality, i.e. the logics of no longer political governing over and decision making on the borders of commonality. Politics is here nothing else than police, in the strictest sense of that term.

If, as we've said, the policed life in the state of exception governed by decrees represents the apocalypse of the political, its impossible and utopian realization, then a conclusion can be made that the politics and reflection on the political as we know it have reached their end and goal.

The forgetting, disappearance or death of politics is thus not only, or it is in the least, a destructive end to all things, because the political mode of deciding has been replaced by another, more efficient and "democratic" mode of deciding, that of policing.

Life that has through and through become law means also life that is its own absolute legitimation. To the life that seeks its own utopia the deficit of legitimation is no problem, but rather the surplus thereof.

On the other hand, the supreme definition of the political with Schmitt is doubled in two decisions. One is the decision on the state of exception, the other one is the decision on the enemy, i.e. declaration of war.

The state of exception and the state of war are two faces of the political just the moment before the dissolution of the politics, and therefore the

state of exception characterizes the internal and that of war the external constitution of community. But when politics becomes police, such a distinction becomes no longer possible, and in consequence the state of exception becomes the state of war. The state of exception becomes a limitless, meaning planetary war. As this is a war that knows no limits and, therefore, knows nothing that could be left outside, thus as everything is included into that war and everything is being counted on - it is a global civil war.

Philosophers following Foucault have tried to deduce this essential conflictuality of the global state of exception from the classical dichotomy of relations of production and productive forces. In the very moment when life itself - absolutely legitimized - becomes a singular subject of policing and production, the war zone becomes ubiquitous, both on the psychophysical-biological level and in terms of territoriality.

War front are now countless, limitless, globalized bodies and populations that live a life determined by decrees and norms of the state of exception, living in a permanent state of transformation, state of permanent loss and gain.

The enemy, from this perspective, is no longer others (as the state of exception, in accordance with the Schmittian intuition, at the same means an existing identity of the ruling and the ruled) - it is rather an anonymous police machine that produces lives and life conditions that are insufficient for the attained level of productive forces, so that a multitude of producers is struggling in order to change those relations.

And as much as that struggle might be legitimate, hasn't it, by recognizing its own legitimacy, already become a part of the state of

exception machine, "democratic" policing machine of absolute legitimacy? Isn't the distinction between the relations of production and productive forces insufficient to conceive of the category of friend and enemy within the post-apocalyptic community of the state of exception?

The possibility of absolute enmity that wouldn't be exhausted in the dichotomy and thinking of the relations of production and productive forces, the possibility of enmity and refusal of the existing state of affairs is, *stricto sensu*, no longer a possibility that might be provided by the reflection of the political or the police concept of the state of exception.

That is the possibility which, similar to the state exception, escapes all phenomenological determination, and which is, for that reason, governed by a different mode of thinking as practice and of practice as thinking.

The possibility of not accepting the state of exception might be thought by starting out from the problem that we said characterizes life in the state of exception: and that is a surplus of legitimacy.

By using Franz Rosenzweig's distinction, one could say: that which makes possible not to accept and to refuse, that which makes possible an enmity within and towards the state of exception as such is not an issue of legitimacy or lack thereof, but is rather the absolute deficit of truth of the state of exception.

Thus we have circumscribed the domain of the normative that results from the dichotomy of "war" and "democracy" and that reflects the deficit of truth of the state of exception: that is the domain of intellectuality, and no longer of the narrowly

conceived epistemical. However, when we say "intellectuality", we don't think there that the "state of exception" as such would be a certain kind of idealization, where the normativity and facticity would continue to compete for the historic or structural primacy. Because, as we have already said, the state of exception already is a solution, and a real existing one, to the distinction of normative and factitious, so that the "intellectuality" in this context denotes something completely different from all possible idealistic schemes.

But let us sum up: the urgency and exceptionality of the state of exception are primarily a thing of the structure of intellectuality, structure of thinking. Thinking is thus not only a marginal epiphenomenon of a "real existing" (political, economical or any other) state of exception, but is rather the motor of that exceptionality. This seems to be the tradition of thinking the state of exception, but also the tradition of thinking as a state of exception, inaugurated by Benjamin and Adorno. That is a singular reduction of the intellectuality to the aphoristic or sentential. However, this reduction here doesn't have to be necessarily understood in the binary opposition of fragmentarity and systematicity (which is of course a traditional topos of political romanticism), but rather in the opening up of the intellectual for its inherent normativity - one which is contained in itself, but substantially questions the exceptionality of (its own) state of exception. To quote a recent reflection on Adorno's "Minima Moralia": "Aphorism, as a form of the permanently declared state of exception of the philosophy, which questions the sovereignty of philosophizing, is a gaze, enabled by a "fragment" in the eye, a "So it is" that is not the final consequence of a sequence of conclusions, and that therefore should not be

confused with epistemic judgments. Aphorism makes 'us' be in the truth, and not 'posses' it."

There, the crucial question: what would, if in the first place there could, be a possible normativity of such an aphoristic thinking, a "So it is", that doesn't exhaust itself in the taxonomic description of social phenomena? What kind of "So it is" it would be if it is not a banal, final result of a reflection that only affirms what is already presumed or known anyhow?

If there is any sense in speaking of such a normativity of the intellectual, one which would with its stripped down sententiality suspend the general suspension itself (which is just another name for the state of exception), the intellectuality should be understood in the sense Adorno ascribes to it - namely, as something that we "are" in, as a social environment of our existences. This assumption relates the Adornian meditation back to the biopolitical theory, insofar as the biopolitical theory truly understand the intellectuality as a general framework of the sociality - under the name of "anthropogenesis".

Intellectuality as anthropogenesis, it is not only the question of singularity or genesis of human kind (no matter whether we do or do not fix a moment of "becoming of human"), it is not event the question of the destiny of "humanity", but it is rather a genetic index of human kind, insofar as the intellectuality manifests a collective and cooperative potential of sociality.

But we have said that it is the intellectuality that is the motor of exceptionality of the state of exception, and this taking into consideration the anthropogenic character of the intellectuality means that - strictly speaking - the anthropogenic complex (or, to put it another word, the question

of "becoming human") is not just an idealistic or ideological supplement for the totalitarian or repressive political systems, but rather that it emerges as a constellation of the state of exception, and concomitantly as a possibility to leave it behind - in the name of democracy, and against the war.

It's maybe now, with the constellation of questions and problems posited in this way, that the entire "monstrosity" of the biopolitical theory and its normative claims after Foucault comes to light. How to think the social with regard to the exceptional state of exception that emanates from the very core of the social, i.e. intellectuality as the potential to communicate and cooperate? And no longer the intellectuality understood as an ideological-idealistic supplement for the material relations, but rather the intellectuality that is an index of the problematic character of anthropogenesis itself.

So, what are the biopolitical productivity and normativity, beyond all eugenic projects of the modernity?

iii. Milovan Đilas's "New Class" opens with a poignant author's confession that the text that follows is a hybrid genre, that it is a text that mixes and combines "the history on a contemporary revolution, [...] exposition of a thinking, and, finally, [...] a confession of a revolutionary." It is a literary mix of historiography, meditations and memoirs - an attempt "to use different methods in a same piece of writing in order encompass as thoroughly and as succinctly the image of contemporary communism."

But the final aim of thus articulated intention was not to provide "a social or any other

philosophy", not even there where the author uses abstractions in order to simply "display the image of the communist world."

It is rather a "so it is", an exposition of thought that suspends the philosophical reflection in the confession of the unconditional social conditioning of thinking on the one hand, and in the sentential reduction to apodictic validity on the other. So it is, or at least hold it to be.

However, a supplement that makes such a meditation on the "image", and no longer on the thought of communism - and this meditation is as Dilas assumes always hybrid and fragile -, consistent - i.e. that what makes it possible for the author's writing to take seriously and to testify credibly of the subject of his elaboration is his invocation of becoming and intellectual's course of life.

"In my life I've crossed, as an intellectual, the entire road that one communist has to go - from the lowest to the highest ranks of hierarchy, from the local and national to the international forums, from the establishment of a true communist party and organizing the revolution, to the building up of so called socialist society. No one had forced me neither to join the communism nor to part from it. I made my decisions myself, to the best of my belief, freely, as much as man can be free in such a moment. I do not belong to those who have been disappointed, although there were disappoints, but I moved gradually and mindfully, creating an image and conclusions presented in this book. By drawing away from the reality of contemporary communism, I was increasingly drawn nearer to the idea of a democratic socialism. This personal development must have reflected on this book, although its goal could neither be nor is in that."

The supplement that allows Dilas to depict the contemporary communist world, and at the same time allows his non-systematic meditation to attain a discursive homogeneity necessary for approaching a task such as the description of the communism in its living totality, is the experience of intellectuality, experience of "personal development". As such, and in order to distance itself from the reality of the world, this experience needs - so that it could leave the impression of a psychological and social integrity - be structured as a teleological (gradual and rational) process.

On the one hand, we thus have a meditative thinking, which in an unstable form of an apodictic assertion "so it is" illuminates in flashes the image or subject of enquiry, and on the other, we have a thoroughly teleological and closed process, where a life's experience of an intellectual living in a communist world doesn't leave much room for a suspicion as to what it is that we are here dealing with.

However, not even this constellation or *montage* of the incompatible is that peak which secures Dilas's thinking a status of a thinking of the state of exception, or rather a thinking as the state of exception.

That what structures Dilas's text is neither meditation nor (purposeful) pragmatic experience of "personal development", it is rather the time pressure of circumstances hastening him to bring the exposition to an end.

Or, to quote: "Furthermore, my personal circumstances are insecure to a degree, and they depend on me only insofar as I still haven't succumbed, where I'm forced to haste with the exposition of personal observations and

experiences, although I am aware that a more detailed enquiry might make more complete and even change some of the conclusions."

Herewith the basic economy of Đilas's text is posited, one that - under constant pressure to fend off an unnamed, yet presumed threat that would prevent finishing of the writing - oscillates between different genres of writing, and it oscillates between reductive, sententious descriptive insights and sedimentary richness of lived experience. The distancing from the reality of the communist world as a political state of exception becomes, in Đilas's case, itself a state of exception. The meditation that aspires to give a "real" image of communism from a genetically higher state (i.e. democratic socialism), because of its immanent riddenness and collatedness does not manage to provide an alternative normativity that would no longer be the one of the perversion of the political.

In this sense Đilas's genealogy of the communist world is not in the least original, quite on the contrary it belongs to the same milieu it wants to distance itself from.

Thus the communism in the East, according to the author, was indeed necessary as a motor for the modernization that the national bourgeoisies were not able to kick start, but at the same time that necessity was also detrimental, insofar as a certain ideology (communist), that was already obsolete in the Western world, has charged for the modernization by bringing the society to an impasse of an insurmountable social stagnation and impossibility of development into the (teleologically) higher social formation. The communist monolith is a key for understanding of all processes, and therefore even a particular Yugoslav phenomenon of workers participation in the

management is assumed to be nothing but a bloodless revisionism of the basic communist matrix that by no means implies a higher degree of democracy, but maybe only provides yet another perfect illusion of the humanity of the communist project. But let us be frank: on these counts Dilas repeats what is already known and offers nothing new.

However, an unstable point of reference of the entire text that Dilas himself particularly is concerned with, as should we be when trying to demonstrate a certain use to a long forgotten critique of communism in the context of a globalized world, is the concept of "new class".

The new class is, briefly, a class that has risen in the name of overcoming of all classes, in the name of overcoming the political and state domain, in the name of social revolution. That is a class that is a remnant that left over once the class society has been suspended, and therefore it can no longer be described in terms of class antagonism, but it still is not a perfect realization of a classless society. That is a class that is in an interregnum. Dilas will invest a lot of energy in his book trying to demonstrate that the "new class" is no longer a classical, vanguard revolutionary party, nor the Western technocratic elite. The new class as an interregnum is not "forgetting of politics", but simply a total perversion of the political. However, the "new class" is neither simply the "nomenclature", or at least not at the moment when Dilas does his research and description. The "new class" is half way through the 50-ties still not stable enough and still not systemically positioned enough to be able to reproduced itself as nomenclature.

This is in part so because the communist project of modernization meant by and large also the project of national emancipation, and hence the

external threat of war was still looming large over the internal (closed) project of transformation of the social. But merging of the form of civil war being led in the (internal) process of destruction of social divisions and the form of war as a threat from outside is for Dilas still not good enough to describe the exceptionality of the communist state, because the merging of different forms of the threat of war (internal and external) maybe might explain the geopolitical, block division, but that is by no means universal enough to describe or define the communist state of exception.

At this juncture, before we go on to quote the passage that we think is crucial for the understanding of Dilas, we will remind that it is the intellectuality that we have named the motor of the state of exception. What that might mean when it comes Dilas, we will explain after a longer quote:

"The most important reason for there not being an organized opposition in the communism lies of course in the comprehensiveness - totalitarianism of the communist state. It has pushed its way into all pores of society and personality - into visions of scientists, into inspirations of poets and into dreams of lovers. To stand up against meant not only dying a desperate man's death, but also to be branded and ostracized from the society. [...]

Not even the two basic forms of opposition - one of the old classes and another from within the communism - were capable either to find programs or forms of struggle. The first were pulling back, and the second were competing with the regime in an aimless and senseless revolutionary zeal and dogmatic outsmarting. The conditions were still not ripe to find new ways.

However, the people spontaneously intuited a new way and resisted in every step and in every detail This resistance is today the greatest and real threat to communist regimes. The communist oligarchs no longer know what their people think and feel. They feel insecure in a sea of dark and deep protest. [...]

It seems that the more the consciousness is constrained and the lesser the potentials for creating an organization are, the more silent and grim grows the protest.

The communist totalitarianism leads to a total protest, where gradually all other differences are lost and only desperation and hate remain."

It seems to us that the following is crucial: the communist formation is defined by an inability for one kind of rationality (for instance, rationality of governing) to perceive other kinds of rationality (in this case, rationality of protest). Perceptive field is divided and there is no "third way" that could overcome the division of rationality and the inability for different rationalities to perceive one another. And insofar a true job of communist government doesn't even begin with a mere overthrow and taking of power, as Dilas informs us, but rather with an everyday, total revolutionizing of relations after the "year zero", then this division of rationality tends to become permanent, i.e. it becomes a perpetuum mobile of the state of exception (as both the cause and the purpose of the process). Dilas in his teleologically determined perspective thinks that the permanency of such state is fragile and will not be continuing for long (what should so called "fall of communism" testify to?), because the plunder of material and intellectual resources cannot continue forever before they are depleted. But, what if the exploited resources are not

limited, and if the very act of anthropogenesis ("becoming of man") has become a primary resource of production? - This seems to us as a crucial question for life within a globalized world.

To sum up: the state of exception is a crucial means, but also purpose of communist politics. As such it can be brought to bear on the issue of modernization, national emancipation or totalitarian-terrorist plunder of social resources (and all in the name of establishing of a classless society), but the essence of the exceptionality of exactly the communist state of exception is its primarily intellectual character, i.e. a permanent and total production of the division of the rational and the perceptive. "Poverty" of the communist East reflects the fact that the basic "material" of production nothing else than that very complex of rational/perceptive. But that was also an index of "wealth" (of utopian potential) in the East.

When we talk about the division of rationality we don't think of a Weberian model of differentiated types of rationality, but of a concept that was introduced by Jacques Rancière: *partage du sensible*. In brief, it is a concept whereby Rancière describes paradoxical mechanisms of political processes, staking his voice against that tradition of political philosophy as we've come to know since Hannah Arendt.

Partage du sensible is a splitting of rationality that can no longer be reconciled, not only insofar as there is no comprehensive rationality, but primarily because of the simple fact that the different types of rationality cannot be reciprocally perceived, recognized. *Partage du sensible* is therefore an indication of a fundamental social misunderstanding, where no teleological movement of different and opposing

rationality towards a consensual mode of reconcilable rationality is given.

Rancière's truly classical example is the status of demos in the Athenian polis. The demos is, looking structurally, left outside of the order of knowledge (as it doesn't adequate the geometrical intelligence), as well as outside of the order of wealth (i.e. arithmetic rationality) - demos is that unaccountable that escapes the structural order, but it is this same "demos" who is denominator that the Athenian democracy uses to attain the title of "democracy". Demos is a "part of those who don't have a share" or "the qualification of those who are unqualified", and that after all serves as a motor to the political, implying also the possibility for a true political, democratic dynamics.

Or to quote Rancière: "That what characterizes the democracy is a pure accident or a complete absence of qualification for ruling. Democracy is a state of exception [...], where there is no default principle of assignation of roles." Democracy is a state of exception, we add, exactly for it is a paradoxical and irreconcilable splitting of the rational into different rationalities, the same as splitting of the rational into incommensurable domains of intelligible and perceptible.

Dilas's "new class", at least as we have presented it here, ironically completely corresponds to the essential element in the democratic politics according to Rancière & that of a dissensual and contingent creation of the state of exception, where "part which has no share" deconstructs no longer a political, but rather strictly policing logics of the social administration. Ironically, because the communist "new class" of the European East perverts and ridicules the neo-classical modeling of political

community (such as Arendt's) and radically antagonistic models of democratic sociality (such as Rancière's)

The "new class" - that central concept in D̄ilas that eludes every rigid definition, but that we know of that it is neither the party vanguard, nor the bureaucratic nomenclature, nor the technocratic elite - is a name of a historical project that has, while trying to answer to the challenge of the social state of exception, by the way of mimicry become the state of exception itself. But that despite of that has in one moment - in the emphasis on the intellectual character of the state of exception - has left a window of possibility open to think the sociality beyond the state of exception, or more precisely, beyond the permanent state of war.

The "new class" faced us with a possibility of a radical perversion of the political in the name of social revolution. However, the "new class" is at the same time a name of a normative project that is interested in - beyond all modernist and biological fantasies of creating a "new man" - radically exposing the fundamentally intellectual character of the sociality, creating thus indirectly that what is always and only at stake - free people.